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This report summarizes the discussion of over sixty participants 
in the April 30, 2007 roundtable convened by the Duke Global 
Capital Market Center.  The roundtable focused on important issues 
posed by the increasing globalization of securities offerings and 
trading markets.  The invited participants were selected because of 
their broad experience as regulators, practitioners, or academics in 
international securities transactions, assuring a wide spectrum of 
views on the future direction of regulation.1 
SESSION ONE:  WHAT CAN THE UNITED  
STATES DO TO MAINTAIN ITS COMPETITIVE POSITION? 
A. Defining the Problem 
U.S. capital markets face more competition than in the past.  
This reflects in large measure the greater choice enjoyed by foreign 
issuers today than in the past.  Not too many years ago, foreign 
issuers had little choice in raising capital other than to do so in U.S. 
capital markets.  Due to improvements in several foreign markets, 
foreign issuers have alternatives to U.S. capital markets.  Further, 
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there are weaknesses in the U.S. regulatory system that place U.S. 
financial markets and their participants at a disadvantage.  One such 
problem is the multiplicity of regulators within the U.S. financial 
market system.  For example, a market participant can find that its 
activities fall under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Controller of 
the Currency, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the National Association 
of Securities Dealers, and various state blue sky administrators, to 
name just a few agencies with jurisdictions that frequently overlap 
and that have differing regulatory styles and requirements.  The 
multiplicity of regulators is ever more present today because financial 
market participants operate their businesses as consolidated groups 
(banking, trading, underwriting, derivatives, etc.) with converging 
products, as opposed to separate units.  The burden posed by this 
multiplicity of regulations is believed at times to drive innovation and 
transactions from New York to London.  This frequently means that 
retail customers are left out of transactions or their participation 
occurs later in the chain of events when the financial product flows 
back to the United States.  Because our current regulatory structure is 
driving some products off-shore and thereby excluding U.S. retail 
investors from participating in these products, U.S. retail investors are 
deprived of the diversification benefits of holding a global portfolio. 
There is a need to reexamine our regulatory framework and to 
do so from the ground up, for equity and debt markets, as well as for 
derivatives and other financial products.  This reexamination must be 
done with an eye toward making our markets more efficient and 
maintaining our high standards for investor protection.  To address 
the various political and economic interests that have developed 
around the existing multi-regulatory approach, any undertaking to 
review the existing structure requires a high-level committee.  One 
such appropriate approach is action by the President’s Working 
Group similar to that which led to successful reforms for futures and 
derivatives.  Problems exist here not just with the Securities Act of 
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, but more significantly 
with the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Investment 
Advisors Act of 1940 because they seriously restrict the products that 
can be offered to retail investors in the United States. 
The architecture of our future regulatory system must be 
sensitive to the great differences that exist between institutional and 
retail investors.  When it comes to securities regulation, one size does 
not fit all.  Informed and efficient regulation should distinguish 
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between the protections accorded institutional investors and retail 
investors, with a much lighter hand in the former than the latter.  
Moreover, in rethinking the future direction of reform, the cost of 
regulations should be balanced with its benefits.  Further, the past 
practice of justifying regulation because of an extremely low risk of 
abuse or fraud should be discontinued.  This problem is particularly 
acute for much of the regulation that occurs under the Investment 
Company and Investment Advisors Acts. 
B. Vision of  Regulatory Reform 
As noted earlier, financial services are converging in part 
because their products are converging.  For example, both insurance 
and banking products frequently entail securities features.  This 
means that a single activity can implicate multiple regulators, both at 
the federal and state level.  Moreover, information sharing and 
coordination among the various agencies is at best informal.  While 
most countries house their financial regulator within the elected 
administration, the group felt that the independent regulatory agency 
model that is embodied in the SEC has worked reasonably well.  
Therefore, there is not a strong sentiment to move regulatory 
functions to, for example, the U.S. Treasury Department.  However, 
it would be useful to explore ways to better involve industry members 
in the regulatory functions such as occurs in the United Kingdom with 
its Takeover Panel.  This would be a means of embedding within the 
regulatory process individuals who are the most knowledgeable.  The 
point was made that the physical location of the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA), within the midst of major investment banking 
community in London, likely makes its ties to the industry stronger. 
While many may view any regulatory reform as a race to the 
bottom, this need not be the case.  In fact, evidence supports the view 
that securities regulatory standards around the world have been 
rising.  The observation was made that, for example, as China’s 
capital markets deepen, Chinese regulatory standards can be 
expected to rise.  This has been the case elsewhere and goes to some 
measure to explain, as observed earlier, the new competitive market 
facing U.S. capital markets.  Thus, what may be the best image is 
neither a race to the top or the bottom, but movement by all 
important markets toward a socially-optimal regulatory equilibrium. 
One question raised is whether the SEC has the capacity to 
reform itself.  This elicited several responses.  First, as observed 
earlier, the issues transcend the SEC.  Financial market participants 
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must contend, simply, with too many regulators on a regular basis.  
This prompts our earlier suggestion for the President’s Working 
Group.  Second, to the extent that reform is to be focused solely on 
the SEC, there are some dramatic illustrations of the agency’s success 
in reforming itself, such as its actions following the Wheat Report and 
the Sommer Report.  Third, the SEC can effect part of the called-for 
reform efforts simply by choosing how to exercise its existing 
authority.  By being more consultative, and less enforcement 
oriented—i.e., prudential—the agency can move reform without 
having its statutory mandate changed. 
C. The London Market 
The vibrancy of the U.S. venture capital and private equity 
industry is linked inextricably to the attractiveness of U.S. IPO 
markets.  Exit is everything to venture capitalists and private equity 
firms, and that regularly occurs via a public offering in which the 
venture capitalists and private equity firms liquidate some or most of 
their holdings.  Thus, capital formation is dependent upon the well-
being of the U.S. IPO market.  As captured in the Report of the 
Committee on the Competitiveness of U.S. Capital Markets, the U.S. 
markets do have several features that make them less attractive than 
the London market: a robust securities class action regime, a 
burdensome auditor attest function called for by section 404 of 
Sarbanes Oxley, weaker shareholder governance rights than exist in 
the United Kingdom, limited work visa availability, burdensome anti-
money laundering requirements, multiple regulators as contrasted 
with the single administrator in the United Kingdom, and a 
regulatory posture that is more enforcement oriented than that of the 
British FSA.  On the latter point, the work of Professor Howell 
Jackson captures a vast contrast in the number of enforcement 
actions and the magnitude of sanctions in the United States versus the 
United Kingdom.2  The question these data pose is whether there is 
equal or even greater levels of compliance with regulatory 
 
 2. In the period from 2002 to 2004, annual average government (Department of Justice, 
SEC, SROs and state) securities enforcement actions resulting is nearly $5.3 billion of monetary 
sanctions as well as other civil and criminal penalties.  Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the 
Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 Yale J. 
Reg. 253, 280, tbl. 3 (2007).  Even when adjusted for relative market capitalization, the average 
annual amount of monetary sanctions in public enforcement actions in the United Kingdom 
over this period was approximately a tenth of that in the United States.  Id. at 284, fig. 10. 
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requirements in the United Kingdom than the United States without 
the burdens and expense of enforcement proceedings. 
One feature that likely explains the regulatory differences 
between the London Market and the U.S. market is that the London 
market was designed and regulated largely as an institutional or 
wholesale market.  In contrast, the U.S. securities framework is not so 
focused, and so much of its orientation continues to be guided by 
concerns for retail investors, even though in IPOs and most other 
market activities price formation occurs at the institutional level.  In 
spite of this, much disclosure is guided to empower retail and not the 
more dominant institutional investors.  The wholesale character of 
the U.K. market makes it possible for the FSA to be less enforcement 
oriented.  When it sees a problem arising from, for example, the 
conflicting interests of the institutional investor and the underwriters, 
it customarily raises its existence to the affected parties and allows 
them to work through the problem; regulation or enforcement occurs 
in the exceptional case where the practice is abusive and not likely to 
be corrected or prevented by the actions of the investor.  This reflects 
the FSA’s view that there are different types of risks and different 
types of investors so that its response is gauged accordingly. It is 
likely time for the United States to reflect on its own markets and 
conclude that its markets are, and for some time have been, largely 
institutional markets.  Regulation should, therefore, begin with this 
premise.  Where there is retail participation, a different approach is 
appropriate.  But much would likely be gained by designing at least 
one entire regulatory framework exclusively from the perspective of 
there being only institutional participation.  In a sense, this would 
embrace a strategy similar to that taken in derivative markets where 
the President’s Working Group supported the passage of the 
Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000, under which 
regulation is tiered according to investor sophistication, with less 
regulation for transactions involving sophisticated individuals or 
institutions. 
D. Prudential and Principles-Based Regulation 
The choice is not between principles or rules.  Rather, the aim is 
to achieve a better balance than presently exists, with rules as the 
dominant norm.  Similarly, the choice is not between consultation and 
enforcement but rather more of the former and less of the latter.  An 
important component of a heavier emphasis on principles is that 
regulated entities should move more of their compliance efforts to 
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higher levels in the organizations, in order for senior management 
and even the board of directors to engage in substantive regulatory 
issues.  Efforts, however, must also occur at the regulatory body.  A 
more prudential approach requires the regulator’s staff to know more 
about the business of the regulated entities and to be able to deal 
substantively with greater complexity.  This shift necessarily involves 
serious upgrading of the regulator’s staff.  At the same time, the 
regulated entities cannot be left adrift or, for that matter, without 
meaningful guidance.  Best practices and other guidelines must be 
available to them. Otherwise, freedom can be a pretty scary 
phenomenon.  It may well be the case that more rules are appropriate 
for transactions that enjoy greater participation by retail investors.  In 
any case, we can expect that even in a prudential, principles-based 
world, compliance officers will feel a great need for guidance; this is 
certainly the case if there is a likelihood of governmental or private 
enforcement actions. 
We might consider that disclosure is an area where a rules 
approach has worked reasonably well.  Moreover, the prevalence of 
private litigation for disclosure violations likely calls for greater 
clarity in disclosure requirements, such that a rules-oriented approach 
to disclosure is appropriate. A more principles-based approach is 
more likely in the market regulation, investment company and 
advisor areas, where a candid dialogue can accomplish the same level 
of investor protection without dampening innovation or introducing 
costly circumvention efforts.  Once again, one feature that would 
greatly enhance the prudential approach is the regulator’s staff being 
familiar with the regulatee’s business.  This is a central feature of 
banking regulation where the bank examiners are most familiar with 
the bank’s operations. 
E. Litigation and  Enforcement Reform 
Perhaps the major concern for foreign issuers contemplating 
entering U.S. capital markets is the risk of private litigation.  
Although the number of class action filings has dropped in recent 
years, the dollar level of settlements is quite high.  Moreover, there 
has recently appeared willingness of federal courts to certify securities 
class actions involving foreign issuers where a substantial portion of 
the class members are foreign nationals.3  We question whether such 
 
 3. Examples where U.S. courts have certified as plaintiffs the so-called “f-cubed class,” 
foreign purchasers who bought a foreign issuer’s securities on a foreign exchange, include Royal 
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actions are in the interest of the United States or, for that matter, 
necessary for investor protection.  If not, it is appropriate for the 
SEC, through its historical amicus role, to express its opinion that the 
certification of a class action with substantial foreign class members 
does not advance the purpose of the U.S. securities laws. 
Additionally, private enforcement extracts sums that are nearly 
eight times larger than government penalties and, as discussed earlier, 
government enforcement itself is a non-trivial concern given the 
current regulatory environment in the United States.  We might also 
question whether private litigation serves a meaningful compensatory 
role in light of the fact that suits historically recover for the class a 
very small percentage of the losses they have suffered and that in 
many instances recoveries pose serious circularity issues, wherein 
class members who continue to retain an interest in the defendant 
company indirectly contribute to their own settlement. 
While some have advised that arbitration or some other dispute 
mechanisms be authorized as substitutes for the present system, there 
was a division of opinion within the group whether this course was 
either feasible or desirable.  The feasibility question relates to the 
absence of any history of class actions occurring within the arbitration 
process as well as to the weak discovery procedures under current 
arbitration procedures.  What appeared attractive was developing 
meaningful safe harbors for various groups, such as underwriters or 
outside directors with respect to their due diligence exposure in 
public offerings, or providing other protections via the SEC’s 
exemptive and rulemaking authority in other provisions of the 
securities laws. 
SESSION TWO:  INTERNATIONAL  
COOPERATION AMONG REGULATORS 
There is evidence that regulators can and do from time to time 
find it possible to converge their various regulatory regimes.  When 
they do converge or engage in mutual recognition, in a sense they 
cede power or authority to their fellow regulators.  Examples of 
successful convergence are the Basel Banking Accords and the 
centralization of monetary policy with currency unification in the 
European Union.  For there to be meaningful cooperation, regulators 
 
Ahold, Royal Dutch Shell, Parmalat, Nortel Networks and Vivendi.  See, e.g., In re Vivendi 
Universal S.A. Sec. Litig., 241 F.R.D. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. 
Litig., 380 F. Supp. 2d 509 (D.N.J. 2005); In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 351 F. 
Supp. 2d 334 (D. Md. 2004). 
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on both sides of the border must have enhanced enforcement powers 
such that a lead regulator is not limited by its national borders in 
activities such as freezing assets, issuing subpoenas, investigating, or 
even settling a matter (the SEC has this latter power but many other 
securities regulators do not).  The past experience of five European 
nations cooperating in their regulation of Euronext and the 
forthcoming cooperation between the SEC and European regulators 
following the merger of Euronext and the NYSE are hopeful 
illustrations how regulators can work together.  These steps may 
entail for some countries important changes in their laws, while for 
others the changes will be less significant.  Even with mutual 
recognition, countries will likely retain the discretion to initiate their 
own enforcement actions, most likely for fraud, should the competent 
agency believe the foreign regulator’s steps are not adequate to 
protect its investors.  Outside the enforcement area, there is de facto 
informal mutual recognition in the case of the easy access of U.S.-
based institutional investors to foreign 144A offerings.  The question 
for the U.S. regulators is whether the freedom enjoyed by 
institutional investors should be extended to retail investors.  As seen 
earlier, a cost of not extending similar freedoms to participate in 
foreign markets is the friction created  for retail investors in acquiring 
global diversity in their personal portfolios.  One approach is to 
proceed with a pilot program in which one or possibly two or three 
EU countries would be targeted for an initial program with a 
designated lead regulator  or a pilot program that is focused on 
characteristics of the investor—i.e., qualified purchasers.  A concern 
is avoiding politicization of the process.  This can be best achieved by 
having clear and understandable criteria before engaging in mutual 
recognition. 
There was discussion regarding the meaning of mutual 
recognition.  The view was expressed that mutual recognition does 
not mean, and its application is not predicated upon, transactions 
between investors in one country, the host country, and a product or 
service provider from another country, the home country, receiving 
the same treatment as if the transaction was entirely within the local 
market or legal system.  What mutual recognition entails is a 
judgment that the home market’s regime and systems are sufficiently 
efficient and protective that U.S. investors do not encounter 
unreasonable risks by participating in transactions governed by the 
rules of the home market.  There was a view that countries must 
retain residual authority for the host country to carry out 
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enforcement efforts, particularly, or perhaps solely, with respect to 
fraud, where it is believed necessary for investor protection or to 
provide relief where otherwise the remedy is believed inadequate.  
Also, there is cause to believe that the degree and content of mutual 
recognition should vary with the actor, so that the contours of mutual 
recognition for issuers will not be the same as for the regulation of 
brokers or investment advisors.  Similarly, the characteristics of 
classes of investors will be an important factor in decisions to engage 
in mutual recognition.  Also, local regulators are likely to retain wide 
discretion to take remedial and protective actions at least within their 
own territorial borders. 
There are some areas where coordination or cooperation can 
only occur if there is some major rethinking of the focus of U.S. 
regulation.  One such area is the regulation of takeovers, where the 
U.S. approach is quite different from that of Europe or Asia.  In other 
countries there is the ability to acquire significant amount of stock 
rather quickly and without much fanfare up to thirty to fifty percent, 
at which point a mandatory bid for all remaining shares must be 
made.  U.S. regulation exempts foreign issuers from many of our 
tender offer rules, provided that U.S. investors hold less than ten 
percent of the issuer’s shares.  With the globalization of holdings this 
Tier I exemption has largely become meaningless.  Foreign issuers, 
thus, who are the subject of tender offers pose serious regulatory 
problems for their suitors. 
Cooperation among regulators in the enforcement area would 
achieve a good deal of efficiencies.  On this point there is at best a 
spotty and uneven record of success, but there are some causes for 
hope.  For example, in the investigation of Royal Dutch Shell, the 
FSA and SEC divided their tasks and shared information and further 
cooperated in the design of appropriate sanctions.  Such coordination 
and cooperation is difficult to imagine with respect to private 
enforcement actions where, as discussed earlier, there is a legitimate 
basis for fears on the part of foreign issuers that small U.S.-based 
investor holdings may provide a basis for class action recoveries on 
behalf of their larger number of non-U.S. investors. 
One objective sought by foreign issuers is legal and regulatory 
predictability.  This quest has greater salience in the context of 
instituting governing rules or principles because an overarching 
framework can provide a context for interpreting the relative 
importance of breaches of particular rules.  Parties wish to know in 
advance what is expected of them.  If articulated and understood, 
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when rules are violated in a material way, it is not difficult to accept 
that sanctions will follow, even if there is some uncertainty as to the 
gravity of the sanctions.  Rather, predictability is more valuable in the 
compliance context, in determining what kinds of breaches merit a 
serious enforcement action.  At the same time, as observed by many, 
the SEC has sometimes used its enforcement efforts as a means for 
establishing rules, practices, and norms.  In this context there is an 
element of surprise because there was not an articulated and 
understood rule that preceded the enforcement effort.  This 
phenomenon is unsettling.  At the same time, predictability in 
enforcement is less of a concern when the object of the enforcement 
action is merely to require that challenged conduct cease; concerns 
for predictability are heightened if the regulator seeks not only 
cessation of the conduct but to impose a fine or other sanction on the 
respondent.  However, these concerns for predictability are not 
unique to foreign issuers or global trading; the concerns arise as well 
for purely domestic transactions.  Nonetheless, the SEC should 
appreciate the impact this uncertainty, particularly in conjunction 
with uncertainty surrounding increased criminalization of capital 
markets participants and transactions, has on the attractiveness of 
U.S. capital markets since uncertainty is never a desired quality. 
A final concern with developing a vision for regulation is 
whether markets will over time evolve to be merely electronic places 
in space without a home country in any traditional sense.  This image 
poses the ultimate challenge for a cooperative, borderless approach to 
globalization of offerings and trading. 
SESSION THREE:  DISCLOSURE METHODS  
AND ACCOUNTING IN A GLOBAL MARKET PLACE 
As we look at how SEC disclosure practices have in many areas 
reflected disclosure approaches embraced by IOSCO, and vice versa, 
it is apparent that in many respects there already is mutual 
recognition in disclosure issues.  There has been a good deal of 
progress in identifying within major capital markets at least the areas 
for which mandatory disclosure should occur.  A major qualification 
of this is with respect to accounting disclosures, where reconciliation 
to U.S. GAAP continues to be required.  However, recently not only 
did the SEC embrace the nearly imminent prospect that International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) will be acceptable for foreign 
issuers entering U.S. markets, but also suggested that IFRS could 
perhaps be used by domestic issuers.  The movement to IFRS and 
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U.S. GAAP as primary systems for financial reporting will be the 
most significant step toward having truly global capital markets.  
Acceptance of IFRS reflects not that standards have converged to the 
extent that they are now mirror images of each other.  Indeed, each 
system differs and will continue to differ from the other in important 
ways so that users of each can likely learn much by more closely 
examining and borrowing from the other.  What the pending SEC 
developments reflect is a high comfort level with the overall quality of 
IFRS, not the close proximity on all reporting metrics of IFRS to U.S. 
GAAP.  There is a lingering concern, however, that IFRS may suffer 
from acute balkanization in that each or many countries within the 
European Union may have their own IFRS variations on numerous 
matters.  This phenomenon can be held within reasonable limits by a 
strong central European regulator overseeing reporting practices 
within the European Union.  With respect to auditing practices and 
procedures, the SEC and Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) have wisely followed a course of working closely 
with individual countries’ national accounting organizations to 
achieve similar levels of comfort with their systems and our 
expectations.  These informal cooperative efforts have been 
successful and should be continued.  Another qualification is that a 
greater similarity in disclosure practices exist between the European 
Union and United States than between Hong Kong or Japan and the 
United States.  Thus, in those countries convergence does not exist at 
the regulatory level but rather via practices imposed by private 
ordering within the sophisticated Rule 144A offering market. 
With respect to the accounting industry itself, there are 
significant structural concerns, the most observable being the high 
level of concentration of auditing services among the Big Four 
accounting firms.  Indeed, in some industry classifications most of the 
auditing is concentrated in two or sometimes even a single Big Four 
firm.  A particular concern that arises from concentration is whether 
this impacts the quality of auditing services.  The bright side is that 
the revenues of non-Big Four firms are growing at a far faster rate 
than for the Big Four among non-Fortune 500 firms.  Therefore, for 
firms, for example, in the Russell 2000 there is a reasonable choice 
among auditors.  One factor that might contribute to firm 
concentration is that state professional requirements compel auditing 
firms to be organized as partnerships and also restrict ownership to 
licensed accountants so that firms are seriously restricted in their 
ability to raise capital.  A more significant factor that contributes to 
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concentration is the reputational issue, which appears to be 
embedded in firm size such that smaller firms will continue to enjoy a 
diminished standing vis-à-vis the Big Four and, accordingly, will 
remain smaller firms.  Large companies do not want to take the 
reputational risk of being audited by other than a Big Four firm.  
Moreover, there is a feasibility issue within certain industry 
classifications so that there are, as a practical matter, only two or 
sometimes three accounting firms that have the experience and staff 
to perform an audit of the firm. 
Since little is known about the financial resources of individual 
Big Four firms it is not possible to conclude how large a threat they 
face from litigation.  However, their risks are largely uninsurable due 
to the lack of meaningful actuarial data.  Firms are, thus, self-insured.  
As such, each firm faces the non-trivial risk of large judgments should 
there be an audit failure.  Also, given the threat of non-proportional 
liability that exists under the securities laws and the significant losses 
investors can suffer at the hands of reporting errors, auditors have 
little choice than to settle, once a motion to dismiss the suit against 
them has been lost.  These considerations present the case for some 
sensible limit on the liability of accountants (and perhaps others such 
as outside directors or underwriters).  Liability fears have had an 
effect in constricting auditors’ engagement in the reporting process to 
the financial statements such that their review and participation in 
other reporting areas—i.e., the MD&A—is less likely today than in 
years earlier.  The question was raised whether limiting the 
accountants’ liability is consistent with a regime of unlimited 
underwriter liability when the latter has significantly less time 
allocated to the issuer’s transactions and its preparation than the 
former. 
One area of friction for a foreign issuer entering U.S. capital 
markets is the greater independence requirements for auditors in the 
United States.  This may well force the issuer into changing its 
accountant, which, due to a variety of considerations, it is ordinarily 
unwilling to do.  Some expressed the view that the SEC would be 
well-advised to reexamine the standards for auditor independence 
against the practices that exist in competing markets. 
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APPENDIX 
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Daniel Cunningham Allen & Overy LLP 
David B. H. Martin Covington & Burling LLP 
David A. Katz Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz 
David A. Sneider Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 
Edward Fleischman Linklaters 
Ellen J. Odoner Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP 
Jeffrey W. Rubin Hogan & Hartson LLP 
Kirk A. Davenport Latham & Watkins LLP 
Matthew J. Mallow Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & 
Flom LLP 
Meredith B. Cross Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and 
Dorr LLP 
Michael Bray Clifford Chance LLP 
Michael D. Mann Richards Kibbe & Orbe LLP 
Norman D. Slonaker r Sidley Austin LLP 
Paul Etienne Kumleben Davis Polk & Wardwell 
Paul Michalski Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP 
Peter Bevan Linklaters 
Richard C. Morrissey Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 
Richard J. Sandler Davis Polk & Wardwell 
Robert Mundheim Shearman & Sterling LLP 
Valerie Ford Jacob Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & 
Jacobson LLP 
Walter A. Looney Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 
John Coffee Columbia Law School 
Mitu Gulati Duke University School of Law 
Donald Langevoort Georgetown University Law Center 
Howell Jackson Harvard Law School 
Jonathan Macey Yale Law School 
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Hal Scott Harvard Law School 
Randall Thomas Vanderbilt University Law School 
Richard Walker Deutsche Bank 
Rachel Robbins NYSE Group, Inc. 
Greg Palm Goldman Sachs 
Gary Lynch Morgan Stanley 
Joseph Polizzotto Lehman Brothers 
David Aufhauser UBS 
Mark Harding Barclays Bank PLC 
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